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1. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of hardware Trojans has largely reshaped the traditional view that the
hardware layer can be blindly trusted. Hardware Trojans, which are often in the form of
maliciously inserted circuitry, may impact the original design by data leakage or circuit
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malfunction. Hardware counterfeiting and intellectual property (IP) piracy are another
two serious issues costing the U.S. economy more than $200 billion annually [Frontier
Economics 2011]. To address such threats, various hardware Trojan detection methods
and hardware metering methods have been developed [Agrawal et al. 2007; Alkabani
and Koushanfar 2007; Jin and Makris 2008; Potkonjak et al. 2009; Jin et al. 2013].
Besides circuit-level security solutions, cybersecurity researchers also rely on layered
security protection approaches and have developed various methods to protect the
higher abstraction layer through security enhancement at the lower abstraction layer.
Through this chain, cybersecurity protection schemes have been pushed downward
from virtual machine to hypervisor [Seshadri et al. 2007]. Following this trend, new
methods are under development through which the hardware infrastructure is modified
to directly support sophisticated security policies so that a system-level protection
scheme will be more efficient [Jin and Oliveira 2014].
It is a rather common practice to think of dedicated hardware primitives that sup-
port the various security applications in the multiple layers of the system hierarchy.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) to produce unique IDs, power regulators to hinder
power analysis attacks, or encryption hardware accelerators are examples of these spe-
cial types of hardware that only find applications in the security context. A large amount
of research and experimentation has been carried out on the design of these primitives
based on the currently prevailing CMOS technology. However, the security provided by
these primitives comes at the cost of large overheads mostly in terms of area.
The development of emerging technologies provides hardware security researchers
with opportunities to utilize some of the otherwise unusable properties of emerging
technologies in security applications. Originally developed as alternatives to CMOS
technology to overcome the scaling limit, emerging technologies also demonstrated
their unique features, which, besides improving circuit performance, can simplify cir-
cuit structure for security purposes such as IP protection and Trojan detection [Bi
et al. 2014]. Traditional metrics, such as power and delay, are the major criteria used
to evaluate the merits of emerging devices; however, in this work, we will include the
security consideration in the overall performance measurements to fully compare the
emerging devices to CMOS technology. Considering the large amount of emerging de-
vice models, including graphene transistors, atomic switches, memristors, Mott FET,
spin FET, nanomagnetic, and all-spin logic, spin wave devices, OST-RAM, magnetore-
sistive random-access memory (MRAM), spintronic devices, and so forth [ITRS 2013],
two fundamental questions have recently been raised related to their applications in
the hardware security domain. First, can emerging technology provide a more efficient
hardware infrastructure than CMOS technology in countering hardware Trojans and
IP piracy? Second, what properties should the emerging technology-based hardware in-
frastructure provide so that software-level protection schemes can be better supported?
Most work with emerging technologies for security purposes to date has explored
implementations like PUFs [Iyengar et al. 2014]; however, PUFs essentially leverage
device-to-device process variation. In some sense, this suggests that noisier devices are
more useful. Orthogonal to these efforts, we present a collection of design concepts that
leverage the unique properties of emerging technologies, other than those relying on
noisy devices, for IP protection and hardware attack prevention. Specifically, the article
considers two emerging technologies: silicon nanowire (SiNW) FETs [De Marchi et al.
2012] and graphene SymFETs [Sedighi et al. 2014b], and makes the following contri-
butions. To assist in IP protection, we introduce SiNW FET–based camouflaging layout
and polymorphic gates to help obfuscate layouts and netlists (see Sections 3.1 and
3.2). We further propose SymFET circuit protectors to counter fault injection attacks
(see Section 3.3). Last, we present a lightweight SymFET-based XOR for implement-
ing cryptographic functions (see Section 3.4). Preliminary experimental results and
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Fig. 1. 3D sketch of the SiNW FETs, featuring two independent gates and their associated symbols [De
Marchi et al. 2012].
hardware infrastructure designs are provided. Simulation results demonstrate that
these emerging technologies outperform CMOS in area and power while maintaining
the same qualitative level of security.
2. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
Driven by the need for post-CMOS technology, a great deal of research has been concen-
trated on the invention of new devices and their applications. Various emerging devices
have been fabricated, including the FinFETs [Hisamoto et al. 2000; Jan et al. 2012; Ma
et al. 2014], tunnel FETs (TFETs), carbon nanotube FETs (CNTFETs) [Appenzeller
et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2011], graphene-based symmetric tunneling FETs (SymFETs)
[Zhao et al. 2013], and spin-transfer-torque devices [Roy et al. 2014].
2.1. SiNW FETs
In several nanoscale FET devices (45nm and below), the superposition of n-type and
p-type carriers is observable under normal bias conditions. The phenomenon, called
ambipolarity, exists in various materials, such as silicon [Colli et al. 2007], carbon
nanotubes [Martel et al. 2001], and graphene [Geim and Novoselov 2007]. Through the
control of this ambipolarity, we can adjust the device polarity during the postdeploy-
ment stage. Transistors with a controllable polarity have already been experimentally
fabricated in several novel technologies, such as carbon nanotubes [Lin et al. 2005],
graphene [Harada et al. 2010], and SiNWs [Appenzeller et al. 2006; Heinzig et al.
2012]. Given an additional gate, the operation of these FETs is enabled by the regula-
tion of Schottky barriers at the source/drain junctions. The example emerging device
considered in this article is a vertically stacked SiNW FET, featuring two gate-all-
around (GAA) electrodes [De Marchi et al. 2012]. Figure 1 shows the 3D structure of
the SiNW FET. Vertically stacked GAA SiNWs represent a natural evolution of FinFET
structures, providing better electrostatic control over the channel and, consequently,
superior scalability properties [De Marchi et al. 2012].
In this device, one gate electrode, the Control Gate (CG), acts conventionally by turn-
ing on and off the device depending on the gate voltage. The other electrode, the Polarity
Gate (PG), acts on the side regions of the device, in proximity to the Source/Drain (S/D)
Schottky junctions, switching the device polarity dynamically between n- and p-type.
The input and output voltage levels are compatible, enabling directly cascadable logic
gates [De Marchi et al. 2012; Gaillardon et al. 2014b].
Whereas many emerging devices demonstrate the polarity control property (SiN-
WFETs, graphene transistors, CNTFETs, NEM relays, etc.), we focus on SiNW FETs
due to their full process compatibility with the current silicon technology and their
high probability of industrial transfer in the near term. In addition, both single tran-
sistors and basic logic gates for SiNW FETs have been experimentally demonstrated.
Furthermore, a simple compact model is available. However, note that the techniques
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Fig. 2. I-V characteristics of SymFET device for different top and back gate voltage combinations.
presented in this article are not limited only to this device but rather can be applied to
any other polarity-controllable transistor devices.
2.2. Graphene SymFETs
As MOSFET alternatives, tunneling-based transistor technologies (e.g., Seabaugh and
Zhang [2010] and Lu and Seabaugh [2014]) are being actively investigated by device
scientists. Among these devices is a double-layer graphene transistor—often referred to
as a SymFET [Zhao et al. 2013]. In the SymFET device, tunneling occurs between the
two graphene sheets that are separated by insulating and oxide layers. Possible IDS −
VDS characteristics of a SymFET, which are a function of a top gate voltage (VTG) and
back gate voltage (VBG) (see the device symbol in the Figure 2 inset), are illustrated in
Figure 2. Similar characteristics have also been observed experimentally [Britnell et al.
2013]. More specifically, VTG and VBG change the carrier type/density of the drain and
source graphene layers by an electrostatic field, which can modulate IDS. Per Figure 2,
the value and position of the peak current depends on the values of VTG and VBG. Note
that the I-V curves illustrated in Figure 2 assume a SymFET device with a 100 ×
100 nm footprint with a coherence length of 0.75X of the edge side and an insulating
layer of boron nitride (h-BN) that is 1.34nm (or four h-BN layers) thick. Although
further study is required, tuning the insulator thickness could represent another design
lever at the device level. For example, theoretically, by reducing barrier thickness to
two layers of h-BN, tunneling current could be increased substantially—albeit at the
expense of higher leakage current [Sedighi et al. 2014b].
The unique I-V characteristics of SymFET offer some interesting circuit-level alter-
natives for realizing both analog and digital circuits [Sedighi et al. 2014a, 2014b]. For
example, simply cascading SymFET devices leads to an extremely small majority gate
design. Furthermore, different combinations of VTG and VBG can change the shape of
the I-V curve dramatically. Devices such as the interlayer tunnel FET (ITFET) have
similar behaviors as the SymFET. We use SymFETs as a proxy for all of these types of
devices.
3. EMERGING TECHNOLOGY IN HARDWARE SECURITY
The characteristics of both SiNW FETs and graphene SymFETs, shown in Figures 1
and 2, prove to us that these new devices are not drop-in alternatives to traditional
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Fig. 3. CMOS camouflaged layout for achieving XOR, NAND, or NOR [Rajendran et al. 2013].
Table I. List of True and Dummy Contacts to Realize Three Functions
for the Camouflaged Layout Presented in Figure 3
Contacts
Function True Dummy
NAND 2,4,6,8,11,12,16,17 1,3,5,7,9,10,13,14,15,18,19
NOR 2,5,6,11,12,18,19 1,3,4,7,8,9,10,13,14,15,16,17
XOR 1,3,4,7,9,10,12,13,14,15,18,19 2,5,6,8,11,16,17
MOSFETs. Instead, these new devices are equipped with unique physical properties
that may be leveraged by hardware security approaches to achieve various highly ef-
ficient implementations for IP protection, Trojan detection, and side-channel attack
prevention. In this section, we introduce SiNW FET– and SymFET-based circuit struc-
tures for hardware security applications.
3.1. SiNW FET–Based Camouflaging
Counterfeiting and IP piracy are among the most serious security threats to the IC
industry. To prevent attackers from learning the circuit schematic through reverse en-
gineering, various protection methods have been developed, among which camouflag-
ing is a popular solution [Chow et al. 2002; Ronald et al. 2012; Chow et al. 2012]. This
method relies on layout-level obfuscation with similar layouts for different gates. As a
result, attackers cannot easily recover the circuit structure through reverse engineer-
ing [Rajendran et al. 2013]. However, the overhead in applying CMOS camouflaging
gates can be rather high such that both power consumption and area would increase
significantly for high-level protection.
In Rajendran et al. [2013], a CMOS camouflaging standard cell utilizes 12 transis-
tors and a group of contacts to achieve three logic functions, as shown in Figure 3.
There are more contacts than in a normal standard cell, as some of the contacts work
as dummies to camouflage the functionality of this logic cell. More specifically, in
Table I, different combinations of true and dummy contacts deliver three different
logic functions. For example, when contacts 2,4,6,8,11,12,16,17 are true and contacts
1,3,5,7,9,10,13,14,15,18,19 are fake, the camouflaging layout performs the NAND func-
tionality. With more functionalities being achieved by a camouflaging gate, it becomes
more difficult for attackers to recover the gate functionality through reverse engineer-
ing. Compared to the 4-T NAND, 4-T NOR, and 8-T XOR gates, the area overhead of
CMOS camouflaging layout ranges from 50% to 200%.
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Fig. 4. One-tile layout for either a NAND or a XOR gate under different pin connections [Gaillardon et al.
2014b].
Table II. List of Possible Functions from a One-Tile Layout
Function
PG1 PG2 CG1 CG2 N1 N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 (Y)
GND VDD A B Y VDD Y GND N/A Y NAND
GND VDD A B VDD N/A Y Y GND Y NOR
Bbar B A Abar VDD Y GND GND Y VDD XOR
Bbar B A Abar GND Y VDD VDD Y GND XNOR
Bbar B A Abar Cbar Y C C Y Cbar XOR3
Bbar B A Abar C Y Cbar Cbar Y C XNOR3
GND VDD A X X VDD Y X GND Y Buffer
It is not surprising that CMOS camouflaging gates consume a significantly larger
area than normal gates. Because of the fixed polarities of both PMOS and NMOS,
designers must prepare spare transistors to build a camouflaging gate. However, the
polarity-controllable SiNW FETs, with their unique property, can help build camouflag-
ing gates without using extra FETs. As demonstrated in Gaillardon et al. [2014b], only
four SiNW FETs are required to build a XOR or a NAND gate (Figure 4). This one-tile
layout includes four SiNW FETs, where circles stand for drain/source pins and bars
represent the polarity gate (or control gate). A further analysis reveals that by connect-
ing pins with different signals, the four SiNW FETs in Figure 4 can perform five other
meaningful functions besides the NAND and XOR. A list of all of these connections,
as well as the corresponding output functions, are presented in Table II. Note that
the functionality of the gate is fixed postfabrication, with gate signals being connected
to physical terminals. After these connections, the polarity gates perform as normal
input gates, and no extra control circuitry is required to maintain the functionality.
This structure, or more precisely the polarity-controllable feature, provides an ideal
candidate for camouflaging gates, as all of these gates share the same structure with
only four SiNW FETs used. In fact, the additional polarity gate is leveraged in the cam-
ouflaging gate layout to reduce the transistor count. The overhead of this SiNW-based
camouflaging layout is negligible, which is mainly caused by additional insignificant
dummy contacts. Following this concept, two SiNW FET–based camouflaging gates are
built of different complexities. The first camouflaging gate performs either NAND or
NOR functionality if different sets of dummy contacts are selected. Figure 5 shows the
layout of the gate where 10 dummy/real contacts are used. As presented in Table III, if
we leave 3,6,7,8,9 as dummy contacts, the gate is a NAND gate. If we make 1,2,4,5,10
contacts as dummy contacts, the gate will then perform NOR logic.
Figure 6 shows a more complex camouflaging gate that can act as NAND, NOR, XOR,
or XNOR given different sets of dummy contacts. As described in Table IV, different
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Fig. 5. Camouflaging layout performing NAND or NOR.
Table III. List of True and Dummy Contacts to Realize Basic
Functions for the Layout in Figure 5
Contacts
Function True Dummy
NAND 1,2,4,5,10 3,6,7,8,9
NOR 3,6,7,8,9 1,2,4,5,10
Fig. 6. Camouflaging layout with four possible functions: NAND, NOR, XOR, or XNOR.
connections can result in four different operations for the same input signals. Again,
only four SiNW FETs are used in this camouflaging gate. Compared to the CMOS-
based camouflaging gate, which needs 12 transistors for a NAND-NOR-XOR gate, the
proposed circuit structure can reduce two-thirds of the transistor count. However, five
more contacts are used in the SiNW FET–based camouflaging gate, although the area
overhead incurred by the extra contacts are negligible considering the transistor count
reduction. To further evaluate the security improvement, the security metric has been
used to check how easily an attacker can guess the full functionality of given designs
containing camouflaging gates. In other words, if one camouflaging layout can achieve
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Table IV. List of True and Dummy Contacts to Realize Complex Functions
for the Layout in Figure 6
Contacts
Function True Dummy
NAND 1,4,8,9,11, 2,3,5,6,7,10,
13,15,16,18,20,24 12,14,17,19,21,22,23
NOR 2,4,7,9,13, 1,3,5,6,8,10,
14,15,17,18,20,23 11,12,16,19,21,22,24
XOR 1,3,6,8,10,11,12, 2,4,5,7,9,13,14,
16,17,18,21,22 15,19,20,23,24
XNOR 1,5,6,8,10,11,12, 2,3,4,7,9,13,14,
16,17,18,19,22 15,20,21,23,24
four functions, the chance that the attacker can retrieve the correct result is 25%.
Therefore, assuming that there are N SiNW FET camouflaging layouts incorporated
in the design, the attacker may have to try up to 4N times to get the correct design
layout. As a consequence, it is promising that the SiNW FET–based camouflaging
layout, which has more functionality and less area consumption compared to CMOS
counterparts, can achieve a higher level of protection to circuit designs.
3.2. SiNW FET–Based Polymorphic Gates
Polymorphic electronics, which were first introduced in Stoica et al. [2004], are based
on the idea of having multiple functionalities built in the same cell and deciding the
input-output relation by means of a controllable factor in the circuit. For instance, a
polymorphic gate presented in Stoica et al. [2004] would be an AND gate when the VDD
is 3.3V and function as an OR gate when VDD is lowered to 1.5V. Such multifunctional
gates would prove useful in a number of applications. Circuits that change functionality
with temperature variation can find use in aerospace applications, or those that respond
to VDD variation could be used to change functionality when the battery is low. In
addition, polymorphic electronics could prove useful in evolvable, intelligent, or self-
checking hardware [Ruzicka 2007]. For security purposes, adding polymorphic gates to
a digital circuit can hide the real functionality of the circuit. Since the circuit functions
correctly only in a certain configuration of the control signals known to the designer,
even if the adversary knows the whole netlist (including the dummy and true contacts),
he or she will not be able to utilize the circuit in his or her own design. Carefully
encrypting a logic in this way can ensure that it will take too long for the adversary to
find the key (a vector constructed from all morphing signals of the polymorphic gates)
[Rajendran et al. 2012]. Therefore, the polymorphic gate becomes a good candidate for
integrated circuits protection against IP piracy.
Traditionally, several CMOS-based polymorphic gates have been reported with dif-
ferent control methods, such as temperature, VDD variation, and external signal level.
A summary of the different polymorphic circuits can be seen in Table V. Stoica et al.
[2004] designed polymorphic gates by an evolution algorithm. However, the circuits
face issues during simulation, as the circuit was evolved to satisfy certain constraints
that do not include all aspects of a complete design. For example, the NAND/NOR
polymorphic gate based on external signal will experience states where the transistors
have to compete over the output, causing the circuit to draw constant current through
those paths. Further, since inputs may be shorted to ground or VDD during certain
states, it is difficult to connect multiple stages of these gates in sequence. The circuit
based on VDD variation is the most practical solution and was fabricated [Stoica et al.
2004]; however, redesigning it in newer technologies where the VDD range is limited
would be a difficult task. Another promising solution presented in Ruzicka [2007] is
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Table V. Summary of Developed Polymorphic Gates
Function Morph Method
Number of
Transistors Where Published
AND/OR 27/125 C Temperature 6 Stoica et al. [2001]
AND/OR/XOR 3.3/0.0/1.5V External
signal
10 Stoica et al. [2001]
AND/OR 3.3/0.0V External signal 6 Stoica et al. [2001]
NAND/NOR/XOR/AND 0.0/0.9/1.1/1.8V External
signal
11 Stoica et al. [2001]
AND/OR 1.2/3.3V Vdd 8 Stoica et al. [2001]
NAND/NOR 3.3/1.8V Vdd 6 (Fabricated) Stoica et al. [2004]
NAND/XOR 0/3.3V External signal 9 Ruzicka [2007]
NAND/NOR VDD and GND
interchange
4 This work
Fig. 7. (a) SiNW FETs NAND. (b) CMOS NAND.
Fig. 8. (a) SiNW FETs NOR. (b) CMOS NOR.
a NAND/XOR gate controlled by a control signal using nine transistors. The gate has
good performance even when we redesigned it in the 22nm FinFET technology node.
Here we present a novel approach to designing polymorphic gates using polarity-
controllable FETs. The ability to control the polarity of a transistor enables us to build
polymorphic cells with a much less number of transistors. As shown in Figures 7 and 8,
the basic NAND and NOR gate structure is similar for both the CMOS and the SiNW
FET. The polarity control gate does not reduce the number of transistors required to
implement NAND and NOR using SiNW FET technology. However, this unique prop-
erty allows us to change the functionality of the gate simply by interchanging the
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Table VI. Simulation Results for NAND/NOR Gates
Average Dynamic
Power for Output
Switching at 1GHz Delay Averaged on
Gate Static Power (pW) (uW) Different Transitions (ps)
FinFET 22nm LSTP NOR 52.19 0.19 28
FinFET 22nm HP NOR 30360 0.67 23.5
FinFET 22nm LSTP NAND 27.19 0.15 23
FinFET 22nm HP NAND 1650 0.652 15.5
SiNW FET 20nm NAND/NOR 8.037 1.77 42
SiNW FET 20nm NAND/NOR 4.127 1.13 56
Fig. 9. Original functionality of a SiNW FET complex gate. (a) Transistor schematic. (b) Gate schematic.
VDD and GND. Note that interchanging the VDD and GND connections in any CMOS-
based logic will produce the complement of the original function at the output, but full
voltage swing at the output will not be achieved due to the presence of PMOS in the
pull-down network or NMOS in the pull-up network. Therefore, using this method, one
can gather the VDD and GND terminals of the NAND and NOR gates in a combina-
tional logic into a vector and construct a “logic encryption key.” As opposed to the work
presented in Rajendran et al. [2012], which adds additional XOR or XNOR gates into
a logic gate to realize the logic encryption scheme and thus incurs performance over-
head, this approach has zero overhead in terms of gate count and trivial wiring cost
due to the switching of VDD/GND. The comparison of transistor counts for different
polymorphic gates is listed in Table V.
The simulation results for the NAND and NOR generic cells using the EPFL SiNW
FET model [Gaillardon et al. 2014b] and the FinFET 22nm low standby power (LSTP)
and high performance (HP) configurations of the PTM model [Arizona State University
2014] can be viewed in Table VI. It is not surprising to see that SiNW FET–based NAND
(or NOR) gate consumes more dynamic power and has longer delay than the CMOS
NAND (or NOR) gate, mainly because of the immaturity of the SiNW FET technology.
Note that the leakage power of the SiNW FET is drastically reduced compared to that
of FinFET technology.
The performance comparison in Table VI does not take the SiNW FET unique prop-
erty into consideration. In fact, the benefits of using SiNW FETs can be revealed if
the polarity-controllable property is leveraged (e.g., sophisticated polymorphic gates).
To validate our claim, a sample polymorphic gate is designed (Figure 9). The two sep-
arate functions shown in Figures 9(b) and 10(b) can be implemented by the SiNW
FET circuit in its different VDD and GND configurations depicted in Figures 9(a) and
10(a). Table VII lists the simulation results of the designed SiNW FET polymorphic
logic and a MUX-based CMOS polymorphic gate that achieves the same functionality.
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Fig. 10. Reconfigured functionality of a SiNW FET complex gate. (a) Transistor schematic. (b) Gate
schematic.
Table VII. Simulation Results of the SiNW FET and CMOS Five-Input Polymorphic Function
Technology Static Power (nW) Switching Average Power (uW) Average Delay (ps)
FinFET 22nm LSTP 0.755 4.04 80
FinFET 22nm HP 491 5.4 60
SiNW 20nm 0.01 2.5 100
As the results suggest, the SiNW FET approach reduces the total dynamic power due
to the fewer number of cells while suffering from a longer delay because of the same
number of cells available in the critical path. Besides the extremely low leakage power,
the overall performance of the SiNW FET polymorphic logic is better than its CMOS
counterpart. Consequently, SiNW FET circuits outperform CMOS circuits in terms
of power and delay while achieving a similar level of circuit protection. The security
metric that we applied measures the difficulty level if attackers want to learn the cir-
cuit structure using the brute force method. In other words, if there are N gates each
with two possible functions in the schematic, it would take 2N trials for an attacker to
determine the exact functionality of the circuit. The benefits can be more significant
in more complex polymorphic logic for large-scale circuits protection. We would like to
point that machine learning attacks may be used to speed up the hacking of encryption
[Baumgarten et al. 2010]. Thus, judicious placement of these SiNW FET polymorphic
gates in a circuit should also be considered to impede such attacks.
3.3. Graphene SymFET–Based Circuit Protectors
Besides the IP protection mentioned previously, emerging devices may also help to
improve circuit resilience to counter various hardware attacks, such as fault injection
and side-channel signal analysis, with extremely low performance overhead and little
circuit redesign. For example, cryptographic circuits are often vulnerable to power
supply–based fault injections [Barenghi et al. 2010]. The manipulation of the power
supply causes faults due to the rise of the setup time needed for registers to switch into
the correct state: this phenomenon particularly affects high-capacitance paths, which
are often the slowest paths of the circuit. In this section, we introduce two SymFET-
based circuit protectors that leverage the unique I-V characteristics of SymFETs to
protect circuits from power supply fault injections.
3.3.1. Current-Based Circuit Protector. As shown in Figure 2, the I-V curve of a SymFET
indicates that the IDS only exists for a narrow band of VDS. Supported by this property,
we propose a current-based circuit protector, which can effectively prevent supply
voltage–based fault injection. Figure 11 shows the proposed structure relying on the
unique properties of SymFETs. As shown in the schematic, SymFET M1 is the only
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Fig. 11. Schematic of a current-based circuit protector.
Fig. 12. Simulation of output current changing with VDD.
Table VIII. Power Provided by a Current-Based Circuit Protector
VDD (V) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
Iout (uA) 0.022 0.067 0.176 1.205 1.904 0.114 0.145 0.184 0.227 0.272
Power (uW) 0.009 0.054 0.211 1.928 3.808 0.273 0.406 0.588 0.817 1.087
transistor directly connected to the power supply VDD, which is also the source to
launch a voltage-based fault injection attack.
We use a specific parameter setting to explain how the circuit protector works. In
our experiment, VTG is set to 0.6V and VBG is set to 0V for all three SymFETs. These
gate voltages can be adjusted so that the peak current will appear in different power
supply ranges than the one shown in Figure 12. Since M2 and M3 are connected in
parallel, source-to-drain voltage VDS2 for M2 is equal to VDS3 for M3, which makes
the output current IOUT the same as the input current IIN. The output current IOUT
is basically a current source for the circuit under protection. For this SymFET-based
circuit protector, the output current can only exist for a specific drain-source voltage of
SymFET M3. If VDS3 is out of this range, either higher or lower than the predefined
range, the SymFET M3 will be cut off. As a consequence, the circuit under protection
will be totally shut down.
The simulation results of the current-based circuit protector in Figure 12 show that
only if the VDD is in the range from 0.8V to 1V, the output current will be at its peak
values (e.g., 1.928uA when VDD is 1V). The power consumption is also derived and
listed in Table VIII. When the supply voltage deviates from its normal value (e.g., 0.6V),
the output current will drop down to 0.176uA. This feature can be directly exploited
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Fig. 13. Voltage-based circuit protector using SymFET. (a) Schematic. (b) Simulation results.
in circuit protection, countering side-channel attacks and fault injections. However,
due to the limited maximum current, the current protector can mainly be applied
for relatively lightweight cryptographic circuits to prevent fault injections. To handle
relatively larger loads, either larger SymFET devices or multiple protectors are needed.
If the attackers intend to lower the supply voltage to trigger a single-bit error of an
encryption design, the entire circuit can be automatically shut down by the proposed
circuit protector before a single-bit error could occur.
Traditionally, power regulators are often used in CMOS technology to protect the
main circuit, but they suffer from large area and power consumption. For example,
Guo and Leung [2010] proposed an area-efficient regulator based on the 90nm CMOS
technology. The regulator includes more than 20 transistors, three capacitors, and one
resistor with a total area of 0.019mm2 and power consumption of 6μW. However, in
our proposed structure, only three SymFET transistors are utilized, leading to an area
reduction even though one SymFET consumes larger area than one MOSFET in a
similar process. The main drawback of the designed circuit protector is the positive
voltage at the virtual ground of the main circuit (i.e., the drain voltage of M3 may be
larger than 0V). However, the proposed circuit protector can be used as an alternative
to the current source, which acts as both a current source and a circuit protector [Li
et al. 2014].
3.3.2. Voltage-Based Circuit Protector. Besides the current-based circuit protector, which
protects the circuit through current manipulation, SymFETs can also be used to control
the supply voltage for fault injection prevention. Figure 13(a) shows the schematic of the
proposed voltage-based circuit protector, which is similar to an inverter design [Sedighi
et al. 2014b]. However, in this circuit protector, the top gates of the two SymFETs are
connected to the voltage source, whereas VB can be manipulated for different cut-off
voltage levels for output Vout. For instance, in Figure 13(b), in the case of VB equal to
0.8V, the output voltage quickly drops to nearly zero when VDD is lowered down to
0.65V, therefore cutting off the voltage supply for the circuit under protection.
To further demonstrate the functionality of the proposed circuit protector, a full
adder in the 20nm FinFET technology combined with the protector is implemented and
simulated as shown in Figure 14. Note that since the current SymFET technology is not
CMOS compatible, 3D stacking is needed to protect a CMOS circuit with the developed
protector. That said, we have shown the feasibility of building digital circuits (Inverter,
NAND, NOR, etc.) using SymFETs in Sedighi et al. [2014b]. Thus, one can ultimately
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Fig. 14. Voltage-based circuit protector on a one-bit full adder. (a) Schematic. (b) Simulation results.
Table IX. Power Measurement of a SymFET Voltage-Based Circuit Protector
Voltage supply (V) 0.8 0.72 0.64 0.56 0.48 0.40 0.32 0.24
Leakage current (nA) 527 220 219 208 179 80.3 20.9 4.33
Power of the protector (nW) 250.5 135.7 142.9 110.3 76.1 30.3 5.9 0.4
Power of the full adder (nW) 310.9 117.0 1.0 <0.03 <0.02 <0.02 <0.02 <0.02
envision a chip comprised entirely of SymFETs. One input of the full adder is set to logic
“1,” and the other input is given as a periodic pulse signal. As we can see in Figure 14(b),
the universal VDD is manipulated to decrease gradually. When it reaches 0.65V, the
output voltage of the circuit protector quickly drops to zero. Consequently, both the sum
and carry-out in the full adder output zero. We also measured the power consumption
by the circuit protector and summarized the results in Table IX. Because the dynamic
power is frequency dependent, input switching is set at 1GHz in the simulation. The
leakage current shown here is the current flowing through the two SymFETs instead
of the circuit under protection. As shown in Table IX, when the power supply is large
enough to make the full adder operate normally, power consumption by the full adder
dominates the overall power consumption. However, if the full adder is completely shut
off when the supply voltage becomes lower than 0.65V, the majority of the total power
is attributed to the static power of the circuit protector. Although high leakage may
not be desired in low-power applications, for circuit protection purposes, the power
overhead is bearable as long as it can prevent the intentional injection from the supply
voltage. More research is needed along this direction to lower the leakage power.
Gomina et al. [2014] evaluated the impacts of power supply attacks where the voltage
sensitivity margin is 0.4V. In other words, a bit flip error would only happen if the power
supply glitch were larger than 0.4V. In what we have presented, the voltage sensitivity
of our designs is less than 0.2V. Before the power glitch attack can be triggered, the
SymFET circuit protector already shuts down the circuit to prevent such attacks. Note
that the sensitivity of the SymFET projector can be adjusted by altering the top/back
gate voltages. Another factor to consider is noise in the power supply. It may be possible
that due to environmental variations (e.g., temperature variation and power noise), the
supply voltage may fluctuate. If the voltage variation is larger than the design margin,
a false alarm will be triggered and the circuit will be shut down even though no attacks
are launched. For circuits working under extreme conditions, we may need to tune the
circuit protector to increase the allowed supply voltage noise margin.
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Fig. 15. Schematic of the SymFET XOR logic.
Fig. 16. Simulation results of the SymFET XOR logic.
3.4. Graphene SymFET–Based XOR Logic
In the cryptographic systems, XOR logic serves as a basic computation unit for many
of the encryption algorithms. Since CMOS XOR gates often take at least eight transis-
tors, area and power consumption of XOR network becomes the bottleneck to further
improve the performance of cryptographic designs. However, in terms of the unique
I-V characteristic and low-power feature, the SymFET brings in a new opportunity for
hardware security implementation. In Sedighi et al. [2014b], a group of SymFET-based
generic logic gates have been investigated, such as inverter, NAND, and majority gates.
Following a similar design method, a lightweight current-based XOR gate is then
developed that uses only two SymFETs. In Figure 15, the Vtg of the upper SymFET is
connected to input signal A, whereas the Vbg is connected to input signal B. The drain
and source of the upper SymFET are connected to the voltage supply and the output
port, respectively. In the lower SymFET, the Vtg and Vbg are tied up to complement A
and complement B, respectively. The drain and source connections of the lower SymFET
are the same as the upper one. The simulation results are shown in Figure 16, which
illustrates that when input signals A and B are different, there will be a steady output
current through the output port. When A and B are of equal value, the output current
drops to nearly zero. In this demonstration, input signals are set as square pulses
with the peak voltage of 2V, whereas the supply voltage remains at 500mV. Since the
peak current happens due to the different configurations of drain-source voltage and
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems, Vol. 13, No. 1, Article 3, Publication date: April 2016.
3:16 Y. Bi et al.
Table X. Summary of SiNW FET and SymFET in Security Applications
SiNW FETs Graphene SymFETs
Benefits over CMOS
Polarity configurable, low static power, Low power, built-in
fewer transistors for applications negative differential resistance
Challenges
Larger area per-transistor, Current-based designs,
large dynamic power non-Boolean computation
Opportunities
IP protection, logic encryption, Side-channel attack prevention,
other security applications cryptographic circuits
gate voltage (see Figure 2), the design also works with the settings of lower VDD and
top/back gate voltage through the same configuration on all terminals.
To fully compare the performance between CMOS XOR and SymFET XOR, delay
and power consumption of both gates are also measured. We implemented an eight-
transistor XOR gate in CMOS 130nm technology with the nominal voltage of 1.5V
[Sedighi et al. 2014b]. (The 130nm CMOS technology is chosen since this feature size
is close to the feature size used by the SymFET device: 100 × 100 nm.) The CMOS XOR
gate consumes 0.632μW. Although the SymFET-based XOR gate consumes 0.68μW,
both gates are comparable in power consumption. However, the average delay of the
SymFET XOR gate is 48ps. Compared to the 135ps delay of the CMOS XOR gate,
the speed of the SiNW FET XOR gate is much faster. With slightly larger power
consumption, the SymFET XOR gate outperforms the CMOS XOR gate significantly
in delay and area. Moreover, the power consumption of the SymFET XOR gate can be
further reduced by lowering the nominal voltage to less than 2.0V.
Although the XOR gate is the basic gate for many cryptographic circuits, other
gates (e.g., inverter and NAND gates) may also be required. Sedighi et al. [2014b] and
Gaillardon et al. [2014a] have already developed logic gates using SymFET and SiNW
FET, respectively. Therefore, the developed XOR gate along with other logic gates can
make the cryptographic circuits perform better than their CMOS counterparts.
4. DISCUSSION
Emerging technologies, acting as alternatives to CMOS logic, have already shown
promising features for high-performance circuit design. However, the metrics to eval-
uate different technologies often follow the traditional criteria, focusing only on power,
delay, area, and so forth for general-purpose computation modules. Special applica-
tions, such as hardware security, are rarely considered, mainly because MOSFETs do
not support security and circuit protection naturally.
In this article, we presented security primitives on how the unique features of emerg-
ing technologies can help to protect circuits and prevent IP piracy. Unlike CMOS logic,
the proposed protection schemes are of much lower overhead because security is not an
add-on feature but a built-in feature. Through the simulation results, the two exam-
ple devices proved to be efficient in hardware security applications. These preliminary
results lead us toward a new metric for the comparison between CMOS logic and
emerging technologies. Whereas traditional metrics, such as power and delay, are the
major criteria to evaluate the merits of emerging devices, in this work, we include the
security metric in the overall performance evaluation to fully compare the emerging
devices with CMOS technology. A summary of the two emerging devices in hardware
security applications is shown in Table X, which lists the benefits and challenges of
the emerging-device–based designs compared to CMOS designs and can help to guide
future designs in the hardware security area.
ACM Journal on Emerging Technologies in Computing Systems, Vol. 13, No. 1, Article 3, Publication date: April 2016.
Emerging Technology-Based Design of Primitives for Hardware Security 3:17
5. CONCLUSIONS
Emerging technologies were investigated in this article for their applications in the
hardware security domain. Instead of simply replacing CMOS transistors with emerg-
ing devices, our work, for the first time, evaluated the unique properties of new devices
in helping protect circuit designs and countering IP piracy. Two emerging technolo-
gies were used: SiNW FETs and graphene SymFETs. Five different security applica-
tions were designed and verified, ranging from IP protection to efficient cryptographic
computation. Through our examples, we demonstrated that the unique properties of
emerging technologies, if used properly, can provide high-level circuit protection with
extremely low performance overhead. Along this direction, new evaluation metrics will
be developed in our future work to better evaluate the merits of emerging devices.
Besides the simulation results, as emerging technologies become more mature, mea-
surements from fabricated devices will also be collected to verify the claim thatcircuit
protection methods can benefit from emerging technologies.
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